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I
INTRODUCTION
Sustainable finance is an umbrella term that generally refers to private-sector
financing for causes related to achieving environmentally or socially sustainable
outcomes,1 such as those articulated in the United Nations’ Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs).2 These include economic development and
financial inclusion. Private-sector financing can take many forms. For instance, it
could be in the form of bank finance, such as for infrastructure and projects that
may have both developmental and sustainable implications (both positively and
negatively at times).3 Such financing also includes social banking, which
specializes in lending for sustainable projects such as wind farms or social
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1. Refer to selected sources for explanations of select terminology. For Environmental, Social and
Corporate Governance (ESG), see Hager Jemel-Fornetty, Céline Louche & David Bourghelle, Changing
the Dominant Convention: The Role of Emerging Initiatives in Mainstreaming ESG, in FINANCE AND
SUSTAINABILITY: TOWARDS A NEW PARADIGM: A POST-CRISIS AGENDA: CRITICAL STUDIES ON
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY 85, 85–117 (William Sun, Céline
Louche & Roland Perez eds., 2011) (exploring environmental, social and governance outcomes); for
Triple Bottom Line, see FRANCISCO SZEKELY & ZAHIR DOSSA, BEYOND THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE:
EIGHT STEPS TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS MODEL 29–47 (2017) (defining TBL as towards
measurability of combined social and economic value creation).
2. See generally Jesse Griffiths, Financing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 61 DEV. 62
(2018); See also Alma Pekmezovic, The New Framework for Financing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development and the SDGs, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS: HARNESSING BUSINESS TO
ACHIEVE THE SDGS THROUGH FINANCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND LAW REFORM 87, 87–105 (Julia
Walker, Alma Pekmezovic & Gordon Walker eds., 2019).
3. WORKING GRP. ON INFRASTRUCTURE FIN., STERN SCH. OF BUS., THE INFRASTRUCTURE
FINANCE CHALLENGE 28–35 (Ingo Walter ed., 2016).
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enterprises,4 and microcredit and sustainable lending to individuals and
households. As global assets under management have grown in the trillions of
euros,5 sustainable finance is also being sourced in global capital markets. These
financings include initiatives ranging from venture capital funding in social
enterprises,6 social crowdfunding,7 green bonds and impact bonds offering
investors a familiar financial instrument but whose purpose or return is based on
the attainment of sustainable outcomes,8 and retail funds that may be marketed
as engaging in socially responsible investing within the conventional universe of
corporate equities and bonds.
Sustainable finance can be distinguished from development finance, which
generally involves achieving developmental goals for less-developed countries
while being led by the public sector.9 This is the case whether domestic or
international, such as in the case of multilateral development banks. However,
even development finance is increasingly being blended with private sector
involvement.10
This Article focuses on sustainable finance for capital markets, as there is a
determined policy movement in the European Union to make sustainable finance
mainstream as investment products. Assets under management in the European
Union reached 23.1 trillion euros in mid-2019,11 and the private financial sector is
in control of significant power and resources to direct finance towards economic
wealth-creation that can meet public-interest needs in long-term sustainability
4. Such as that financed by Triodos, a social bank based in the Netherlands. Wind Farm
Ransonmoor, TRIODOS BANK, https://www.triodos.co.uk/projects/wind-farm-ransonmoor/19498 [https://
perma.cc/7LWD-UTD7]; Olaf Weber, Social Banks’ Mission and Finance, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK
OF SOCIAL AND SUSTAINABLE FINANCE 467, 467–79 (Othmar M. Lehner ed., 2016); see generally
Nicholas E. Florek, Enabling Social Enterprise Through Regulatory Innovation: A Case Study from the
United Kingdom, 3 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 155 (2017).
5. Nicolas Moreau, Asset Managers Can Help Society While Rebuilding Wealth, FIN. TIMES (June
24, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/1a36ac32-8c3a-453a-900a-a9734d658b4c [https://perma.cc/Q88XD7DW].
6. Pascale Château Terrisse, In What Conditions Can Venture Capital and Social Justice Co-Exist?
A Case Study of a French Venture Capital Fund Investing Ethically in Africa, in FINANCE AND
SUSTAINABILITY: TOWARDS A NEW PARADIGM? A POST-CRISIS AGENDA 211, 211–32 (William Sun,
Céline Louche & Ronald Perez eds., 2011).
7. Othmar M. Lerner, Crowdfunding Social Ventures: A Model and Research Agenda, 15
ROUTLEDGE VENTURE CAP. J. 283, 284-5 (2013).
8. Stephen Kim Park, Investors as Regulators: Green Bonds and the Governance Challenges of the
Sustainable Finance Revolution, 54 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 5–10 (2018); M. Chiesa & S. Barua, The Surge of
Impact Borrowing: The Magnitude and Determinants of Green Bond Supply and Its Heterogeneity Across
Markets, 9 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 138, 142 (UNDER PARA 2.3) (2019).
9. Lucien Georgeson & Mark Maslin, Putting the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals
into Practice: A Review of Implementation, Monitoring, and Finance, 5 GEOGRAPHY & ENV’T 1, 14
(2018).
10. ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., MAKING BLENDED FINANCE WORK FOR THE SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT GOALS 1, 100 (2018), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/making-blended-fin
ance-work-for-the-sustainable-development-goals_9789264288768-en [https://perma.cc/HQ2V-6WCH].
11. European Assets Under Management Have More Than Doubled, EUR. FUND & ASSET MGMT.
ASS’N. (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.institutionalassetmanager.co.uk/2019/09/17/278738/european-assetsunder-management-have-more-doubled-last-decade-says-efama [https://perma.cc/BAD2-8QHN].

05_CHIU_SUSTAINABLE FINANCE IN CAPITAL MARKETS (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1 2021] REGULATING SUSTAINABLE FINANCE IN CAPITAL MARKETS

2/28/2021 12:36 PM

77

and social wellbeing. Hence European policymakers have endorsed a reform
agenda to galvanize the engagement of conventional investment funds in
sustainable finance.12 The mainstreaming agenda affects two systems of law:
financial regulation and corporate law.
With regard to financial regulation, the mainstreaming agenda makes it
mandatory for conventional investment funds to engage with sustainable
finance.13 Law reforms have been introduced to compel investment fund
managers of all manners of conventional and alternative funds to integrate
sustainability risks into their investment strategies.14 New legislation has also
been introduced to clarify what sustainable investments are,15 but this effort is
more developed in terms of environmental sustainability, with social
sustainability being a work in progress.16
In corporate law, the mainstreaming agenda is targeted at greater
transparency of the sustainable behavior and performance of corporations that
are the conventional objects of financial investment. This would allow investment
funds to take into account the sustainability of firms’ operations when evaluating
and pricing their debt and equity, thereby exerting market discipline to shape
corporate behavior. It should be noted that corporate behavior is also directly
shaped by other policies and measures such as environmental regulation;17 carbon
permits;18 other corporate regulation in product liability, health and safety;19 and
so on. However, there are gaps in regulation where corporations have an impact

12. EU HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GRP. ON SUSTAINABLE FIN., FINANCING A SUSTAINABLE
EUROPEAN ECONOMY (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/180131-sustainable-finance-finalreport_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/ELA4-ENSU] [hereinafter HLEG REPORT].
13. Commission Regulation 2019/2088 of Nov. 27, 2019, Sustainability related Disclosures in the
Financial Services Sector, art. 1, 2019 O.J. (L 317) [hereinafter Disclosure Regulation].
14. Id. at arts. 3, 4–6.
15. Id. at art. 2.
16. See generally ESMA Responds to European Commission Consultation on Renewed Sustainable
Finance Strategy, EUR. SEC. & MKT. AUTH. [ESMA] (July 16, 2020), https://www.esma.europa.eu/pressnews/esma-news/esma-responds-european-commission-consultation-renewed-sustainable-finance
[https://perma.cc/A54T-XAUY] (ESMA has quickly, on the back of recent EU legislative reforms for
sustainable finance, pointed out gaps for work in progress).
17. BENJAMIN J. RICHARDSON & BEATE SJÅFJELL, Capitalism, the Sustainability Crisis, and the
Limitations of Current Business Governance, in COMPANY LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY 1, 1–5 (2015).
18. See Richard B. Stewart, Climate Finance for Limiting Emissions and Promoting Green
Development: Mechanisms, Regulation, and Governance, in CLIMATE FINANCE REGULATORY AND
FUNDING STRATEGIES FOR CLIMATE CHANGE AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT 1, 5, 8–9, 23 (Benedict
Kingsbury & Bryce Rudyk eds., 2009) (discussing carbon credits trading markets).
19. See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION
(2000) (reviewing successful reforms).
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on sustainable outcomes, such as social or human development,20 that have been
left to voluntary measures of corporate responsibility.21
This Article locates the mainstreaming agenda of sustainable finance within
the theoretical framework of decentered regulation,22 reflecting how both
financial and corporate constituents are embedded in structures of social
relations.23 This framework goes beyond characterizing the mainstreaming
agenda as merely market-based or neoliberal, as the agenda does not only
leverage incentive-based drivers on the part of financial and corporate
constituents. Rather, the reforms contain certain prescriptive, enabling,24 and
meta-regulatory25 elements that are consistent with allowing these constituents to
co-contribute towards the public good. However, the mobilization of financial
and corporate constituents takes place within certain theoretical boundaries,
rationalities, and institutional structures in the systems of financial regulation and
corporate law, which we call “systems internalities” in this Article.26 These
internalities interact with the reform agenda to produce incremental changes in
fund investment and corporate behaviors, decreasing the likelihood that the
current agenda will produce significant radical changes.
Incrementalism has been criticized as insufficient for the public-interest goals
of maintaining sustainable planetary boundaries,27 meeting the Paris
Agreement’s climate change target,28 or delivering on the SDGs. However,
incrementalism is likely to be less disruptive for economic and social life while
20. David Wood, What Do We Mean by the S in ESG? in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT 553, 553–64 (Tessa Hebb, James P. Hawley, Andreas G. F. Hoepner, Agnes
L. Neher & David Wood eds., 2015).
21. See PATRICIA H. WERHANE, KENNETH E. GOODPASTER, ARCHIE B. CARROLL, KENNETH J.
LIPARTITO, JAMES E. POST, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 1, 1–5 (2012) (reviewing the evolution of
voluntary CSR practices).
22. Decentered regulation refers to the concept of private firms overseeing actors, and imposing
regulation through private action. See Dimity Kingsford Smith, Beyond the Rule of Law? Decentered
Regulation in Online Investing, 23 LAW & POL’Y 439, 444–45 (2004) (“[T]he essential feature of
decentering is that the state is not central in the creation, implementation, or enforcement of
regulation.”).
23. Jay Cullen & Jukka Mähönen, Taming Unsustainable Finance, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY 100, 100–13
(Beate Sjåfjell & Christopher M. Bruner eds., 2020).
24. See Barak Orbach, What is Regulation? 30 YALE J. ON REGUL. ONLINE 1, 4–5 (2012) (explaining
that regulation does not need to be restrictive and constraining in character and can enable and facilitate
activities).
25. See Cary Coglianese & Evan Mendelson, Meta-Regulation and Self-Regulation, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 146, 146–68 (R. Baldwin, M. Cave & M. Lodge eds., 2010); CHRISTINE
PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION 245–47 (2002) (setting out the broad framework of regulatory
principles and outcomes and delegates implementation to regulated entities).
26. See infra Parts II and III (exploring the effects of systems internalities on regulatory initiatives
intended to promote sustainability).
27. See Beate Sjåfjell, Redefining the Corporation for a Sustainable New Economy, 45 J. L. & SOC’Y
29, 31 n.n.2–3 (2018) (defining planetary boundaries as environmental phenomena that have been
scientifically identified as important for preservation).
28. See generally Howard Covington, Investment Consequences of the Paris Climate Agreement, 7 J.
SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 54 (2017).
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preparing for further change. Looking at the theoretical design of decentered and
socially embedded regulation from the perspective of systems internalities has
implications for considering what radical regulatory and policy designs may be
needed to achieve radical change.
II
SUSTAINABLE FINANCE AS SOCIALLY EMBEDDED DECENTERED
REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE
Embeddedness is explained in Mark Granovetter’s classic work as a
perspective of economic activity that is neither over-nor under-socialized.29
Under-socialization relates to the depiction of economic activity in the
reductionist terms of being incentive-driven and instrumentally-motivated.30
Over-socialization is a view of economic activity that is too dependent on social
forces and contexts such that the individual will is underplayed.31 Granovetter
sees economic activity as being embedded in social contexts, situations and
institutions, between the under-socialized and over-socialized ends of the
spectrum.32
Although private-sector finance can be regarded as transactions that provide
for private financial needs, the financialization of the modern economy is a socioeconomic phenomenon at grand scale. Where, for example, societies and states
have retreated from ordering citizens’ financial welfare through state-owned
banks and generous state pensions, private financial institutions have stepped
into the gaps.33 Financialization has been defined as “the increasing role of
financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in
the operation of the domestic and international economies.”34 The increasing
importance of finance may be observed in steady increases in Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) accounted for by the financial sector in the United States,35 the

29. See Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,
91 AM. J. SOCIO. 481, 481–85 (1985) (noting that economic action is neither driven purely by individual
incentives nor by the social pressures or context for an individual, it is often driven by a mixture of both).
30. See NEIL J. SMELSER AND RICHARD SWEDBERG, Introduction to Economic Sociology, in THE
HANDBOOK ON ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 3, 3–20 (2005) (challenging the rationale for individuals in
economic action as part of a holistic understanding of how individuals’ economic actions are motivated
in contrast to incentive-based understanding promoted in economics).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Financialization promotes the liberalization of financial markets to serve sovereigns’
corporations, households’ borrowing and investment needs. See generally GERALD A EPSTEIN,
Introduction: Financialization and the World Economy, in FINANCIALIZATION AND THE WORLD
ECONOMY, 1 (2005) (canvassing the rise of financial markets and the economic effects of financialization,
e.g. the widening gap between those who derive incomes from financial activity and conventional
economic activities).
34. Id. at 3.
35. Thomas Philippon, Has the U.S. Finance Industry Become Less E cient? On the Theory and
Measurement of Financial Intermediation, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1408, 1431–34 (2015).
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United Kingdom,36 and Europe.37 Hence, in achieving the pan-European goals of
development, environmental sustainability, and social wellbeing, policymakers
see the financial sector as an essential actor in achieving the goals of public good.
In its allocative role, finance is able to work at the micro levels of transactions to
fund activities. It is imperative that finance contributes not only to private value
creation but also to collective outcomes that would ultimately result in mitigating
harm and delivering longer-term public good.38 This policy direction is not merely
based on win-win rhetoric that relies on the financial sector’s own incentives to
do good by doing well. Rather, it endorses an imperative view of directing and
enabling financial-sector actors, firmly locating finance within the social fabric of
Europe.39 In this manner, social embeddedness theoretically anchors the
mainstreaming agenda for sustainable finance.
However, social embeddedness does not give rise to command-and-control
forms of regulation to prescribe how financial institutions should fund objects of
investment. There is no singular means for achieving sustainable goals and
regulators have over the years adopted more flexible regulatory techniques to
address the complexity of regulatory needs. In particular, Julia Black argues that
decentered regulation in the financial sector is appropriately characterized by
five
characteristics:
complexity,
fragmentation,
interdependencies,
ungovernability, and the rejection of a clear private-public distinction.40
Complexity refers to the nature of problems that may need to be dealt with.
Fragmentation refers to the division of knowledge, resources, and capacity for
control in the regulatory space. Interdependencies refer to the dynamics between
the participants in the regulatory space, co-producing and co-enforcing norms of
governance. Ungovernability refers to the autonomy and unpredictability of
actor behavior in the regulatory space. In a decentered landscape, there is, some
argue, no public-private distinction as all participants contribute to governance.
The decentered analysis has been applied to financial regulation,41 as the financial
services industry is a powerful and innovative industry with resources for
governance. Stefano Pagliari also argues that regulators look favorably upon
leveraging market-based discipline in finance so as to develop forms of reflexive
governance.42
36. See Chris Rhodes, Financial services: contribution to the UK economy, HOUSE OF COMMONS
LIBR. (July 31, 2019), https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn06193/ [https://perma.
cc/BP7J-3D53] (estimating that the sector contributes about 7% of the UK’s GDP).
37. Guillaume Bazot, Financial Consumption and the Cost of Finance: Measuring Financial
Efficiency in Europe 16 J. EUROPEAN ECON. ASS’N 123, 134 (Paris Sch. of Econ., Working Paper Version
1, 2014), (2018).
38. HLEG REPORT, supra note 12, at 12.
39. Id.
40. Julia Black, Enrolling Actors in Regulatory Systems: Examples from UK Financial Services
Regulation, in PUBLIC LAW 63, 63–65 (Andrew Le Sueur & G. Marshall eds., 2003).
41. Julia Black, Mapping the Contours of Contemporary Financial Services Regulation, 2 J. CORP. L.
STUD. 253, 254–55 (2002).
42. Stefano Pagliari, Who Governs Finance? The Shifting Public-Private Divide in the Regulation of
Derivatives, Rating Agencies and Hedge Funds, 18 EUR. L.J. 44, 50 (2012).
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The EU’s mainstreaming agenda bears the hallmarks of decentered
regulation as the law reforms are intended to stimulate capital market
mobilization for sustainable finance and to make such markets work better, such
as in relation to price formation.43 Moreover, the agenda also includes steering
and motivating market-based actors and stakeholders to improve visibility and
evaluative bases for hard-to-value collective goods.44 Hence policymakers supply
frameworks for market-building but financial institutions still need to reconfigure
their investment objectives and behavior, and corporations need to respond in
turn. The reform agenda therefore mobilizes but does not micromanage.
This Article argues that such mobilization necessarily requires financial
sector and corporate actors to co-contribute their existing governance capacity
and resources to the decentered regulation landscape to build up a robust and
governed market for sustainable finance. However, this process is likely to be
incremental in nature. The co-contribution roles of the private sector bring with
them the existing baggage of their systems internalities. In this manner,
incrementalism is the likely trajectory. Policymakers need to determine if such
outcomes are within their intentions and expectations or that more radical shifts
are needed.
III
SYSTEMS INTERNALITIES AND THE REFORM AGENDA FOR INVESTMENT
FUNDS
The reform agenda for investment funds comprises two key features. The first
is that an explicit duty to integrate sustainability risks is introduced in investment
management,45 overcoming doubts regarding whether fiduciary duties can
accommodate sustainability considerations. The second is regulatory
standardization for sustainably labelled financial products in relation to quality
and marketing.46 These two measures are aimed at existing inhibitors for the
galvanization of sustainable finance in mainstream investment fund
management, namely the perception that funds’ fiduciary duties are incompatible
with pursuing sustainability objects and that sustainably labelled investment fund
products lack standardization and therefore credibility.
In 2017, the European Shareholders’ Rights Directive introduced a complyor-explain requirement for asset owners and their managers to make transparent
how their investment policies would meet their liabilities, and how engagement
43. Such is the function of Article nine of the Disclosure Regulation, which treats investment firms’
mandatory disclosures about products’ sustainable performance as pre-contractual disclosures so that
civil actions based on falsehood can subsequently be carried out if warranted. See Disclosure Regulation,
supra note 13, at art. 9.
44. See e.g., Disclosure Regulation, supra note 13 (requiring periodic reporting of sustainable
investments’ performance in relation to sustainability impact).
45. Id. at art. 2.
46. Id. at arts. 8–11; Commission Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of June 18, 2020, The Establishment of
a Framework to Facilitate Sustainable Investment, and Amending Regulation (EU) 2019/2088, arts. 3–7,
2020 O.J. (L 198) 13.
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with their investee companies in both financial and non-financial performance
would affect the objectives of their investment management.47 This non-binding
measure is a firm nudge for asset owners and managers towards shareholder
engagement with their investee companies more generally, while referring to but
not exclusively focusing on environmental and social matters. The Rights
Directive now requires investment funds and managers to disclose in their
policies and marketing communication how they integrate sustainability risks
into their investment strategies.48 This means that such integration is not optional,
stepping up from the comply-or-explain nature of the 2017 reform.
These reforms have frontally challenged the conservative view that
investment funds’ fiduciary duties to savers are confined to achieving financial
performance and that they cannot be distracted by social objectives.49 The
separation of financial and non-financial objectives in earlier jurisprudence can
be regarded as in need of modernization where a non-financial issue entails
material consequences.50 The reforms provide some clarity in response to funds’
aversion to legal risk in relation to uncertainties in interpreting their fiduciary
duties. However, as in the nature of new governance regulatory strategies,51
investment funds are co-opted to implement the integration of sustainability risks
into their structures and business models, therefore providing their own
processes and procedures such as in relation to due diligence and evaluation. The
open-ended nature of implementation is characteristic of a decentered approach
to regulation,52 allowing regulated entities to refine a dynamic interpretation of
such risks in a co-learning and co-evolving approach with the regulator.
Nevertheless, the way funds integrate sustainability risks depends on the systems

47. Disclosure Regulation, supra note 13, at art. 3(g)–(h).
48. Larger firms are subject to more prescriptive behavior in that integration includes due diligence
policies and implementation to measure prescribed adverse sustainability impact. Id. at arts. 3–6.
49. See generally Cowan & Ors v. Scargill & Ors, 1990 Pension L. Rep. 170 (High Ct., Ch. 1990).
50. See UN ENV’T PROGRAMME, FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY IN THE 21st CENTURY, 21
(2019) (clarifying that according to the traditions of investment managers’ fiduciary duties in many
jurisdictions, material ESG factors that affect investment performance should be incorporated into
investment management). See Jennifer Bender, Todd Arthur Bridges & Kushal Shah, Reinventing
Climate Investing: Building Equity Portfolios for Climate Risk Mitigation and Adaptation, 9 J.
SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 191, 193–94 (2019) (discussing the financial materiality of climate change
concerns in relation to risk management, risk of stranded assets); see also Bob Buhr, Assessing the Sources
of Stranded Asset Risk: A Proposed Framework, 7 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 37, 48–51 (2017)
(providing an overview of the financial implications of climate risk such as operational, transition, natural
capital risks as well as stranded asset risk which means that asset values deteriorate due to the impact of
environmental degradation and climate change).
51. See Cristie Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation, 45
AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 27–30 (2008) (arguing that regulatory design that requires the regulated to implement
regulatory principles in order to achieve broadly-framed outcomes is sound, though potentially flawed
by potential pitfalls such as lax light-touch supervision).
52. See Timothy Cadman, Evaluating the Governance of Responsible Investment Institutions: An
Environmental and Social Perspective, 1 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 20, 21–22 (2011) (noting that
responsible investment institutions engage with multi-stakeholders as well as seek to achieve outcomes
that are environmentally or socially salient, though there is a lot of fragmentation in practice in terms of
stakeholder engagement and measuring environmental or social achievements).
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internalities of the investment fund industry. This can create limitations for how
funds understand and implement these new obligations, especially within the
investment chain.
The investment chain describes the web of delegation and division of labor
that services the management of assets for asset owners.53 John Morley describes
the key phenomenon in investment management as the separation of funds from
managers.54 Funds are incorporated in separate entities and management of
assets is delegated to different portfolio managers. Portfolio managers are further
serviced by service providers such as custodians, proxy advisers, and brokers. We
argue that the systems internalities of the investment chain are important for
shaping the integration of sustainability risks into investment management, and
that this leads to an incremental and not radical approach to internalizing
sustainability in investment management.
The obligation to internalize sustainability risks is imposed at the fund
manager level. However, fund managers serve as agents for investment funds,
which act as principals. Although the EU reforms intend investment funds as
principals to monitor their fund managers through the latter’s integration
approaches and disclosures, it is likely that funds would also be wary of any
contradiction between the duty of integration and the contractual mandates
between funds and asset managers. New legal risk and uncertainty on both sides
may result in conservative approaches. Further, the U.K. has introduced nonbinding soft law in the form of the Stewardship Code to encourage alignment
between asset owners and managers in terms of objectives, strategies and better
governance of this relational paradigm.55 The soft law is open-ended in nature
and does not address the real problem, which is the common uncertainties faced
by funds and their managers in navigating sustainability risks. Asset owners are
often less sophisticated than managers in the pension fund context,56 while
mutual funds constituted by large investment firms are conflicted in being
beholden to the asset manager.57 These dynamics are not addressed by the broadbrush approach in the Stewardship Code.
Further, asset owners are also under a duty to consider value for money in
relation to the expenses of investment management,58 and mutual funds in
particular have a duty to uphold fund liquidity. These duties disincentivize
engaging in unfamiliar investments whose expense profiles or liquidity profiles

53. DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, EXPLORING THE INTERMEDIATED SHAREHOLDING
MODEL 14 (2016),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/489357/bis-16-20-intermediated-shareholding-model.pdf [https://perma.cc/25AY93PH] (focusing on the investment chain in terms of exercising rights in investee companies).
54. John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Structure
and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1234 (2013–14).
55. FIN. REP. COUNCIL, THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 2020, at 8-9 (2020).
56. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., ASSET MANAGEMENT MARKET STUDY FINAL REPORT, annex 1, 4
(2017).
57. Id. at annex 1, 11.2.
58. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., FCA HANDBOOK, COLL 4.5.7, 6.6.20-22, 8.3.5A, 8.5.16-19.
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are not as predictable.59 Faced with conflicting regulatory demands in terms of
being both rational and socially-oriented, being willing to engage in new
sustainability profiles in investments while being tied to familiar liquidity
expectations, asset owners and fund managers are likely to pursue conservative
strategies, such as making small allocations to sustainably-labelled products or
monitoring excessively the financial performance of these products. Fund
managers also tend to rely on other service providers such as exchange indices
that classify sustainable companies,60 or external providers of environmental,
social, and corporate governance (ESG) ratings to manage sustainability risks in
order to offer services that seem to meet funds’ financial needs and the needs to
invest responsibly.61 The universe of socially responsible investing has evolved to
provide some distinction from conventional investments without going too
radically far.62
Perhaps a greater allocation by asset owners to socially responsible funds may
result from the EU reforms,63 but this would likely be incremental. On the
pension fund end, a greater allocation would result if advised by investment
consultants,64 but it is unlikely that these agents would take the trailblazing
approach of radically changing asset owners’ allocations for fear of repercussions
in legal risk. For mutual funds, their liquidity needs remain a constraint in relation
to considering the integration of sustainability risks, and radical moves away from
conventional allocations may be avoided. The collapse in the U.K. of mutual
funds managed by Neil Woodford, famous British investor and founder of
Woodford Investment Management, would serve as a cautionary tale to many

59. See generally Roger M. Barker & Iris H-Y Chiu, Investment Management and Corporate
Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, 198–256 (2017).
60. See generally Steve Lydenberg & Alexi White, Responsible Investment Indexes, in THE
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, supra note 20, at 527 (providing background
on socially responsible index funds).
61. Examples of external providers of ‘ESG’ ratings include Vigeo-Eiris, and Sustainalytics.
Mohamed Chelli & Yves Gendron, Ratings and the Disciplinary Power of the Ideology of Numbers, 112
J. BUS. ETHICS 187, 193 (2013). For a critique of sustainability ratings providers, see generally Dan Esty
& Todd Cort, The Data Challenges that Remain, in SUSTAINABLE INVESTING: REVOLUTIONS IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 91 (Cary Kronsinsky & Sophie Purdom eds., 2017) (discussing reliability of
data, opacity of methodology, etc.).
62. See Christin Nitsche & Michael Schröder, Are SRI Funds Conventional Funds in Disquise or do
They Live up to Their Name?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF INVESTING IN THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE,
414, 442 (Sabri Boubaker, Douglas Cumming & Duc Khuong Nguyen, eds., 2018) (finding that SRI funds
tend to have higher ESG ratings than conventional funds, although the “fund holdings of SRI and nonSRI funds are very similar”). However, commentators also argue that screenings do achieve substantive
differences. See generally Marco Heimann, Sébastien Pouget, Étienne Mullet & Jean-François Bonnefon,
The Experimental Approach to Trust in Socially Responsible Investment Funds, in FINANCE AND
SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 169.
63. Disclosure Regulation, supra note 13.
64. See DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS and John Morely, supra notes 53–54(describing the
disintermediated nature of the investment chain, where decision-making in asset allocation is often
dependent on third-party advisors).
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fund managers, who will remain concerned with liquidity risk while managing
new mandates.65
Commentators have been skeptical that socially-responsible investing, which
is an incremental step from conventional investment management, has
structurally changed corporate behavior or achieved substantive sustainable
outcomes.66 Where asset owners invest in passive mandates due to costeffectiveness and are tied to, for example, the FTSE4Good Index, the allocation
of funds is directed at an evaluation outsourced to another entity.67 Even in active
management mandates where fund managers are to pick stocks, empirical
research finds heavy reliance by fund managers on indices, as they may not have
superior sources of diligence or information.68 More radical investment
strategies, such as shareholder activism by funds or their asset managers in
companies so as to improve those companies’ sustainable behavior, are relatively
more expensive strategies, but are on the rise.69 Further, fund investment in assets
that are directly connected to a sustainable purpose or outcome, such as green
and impact bonds, remains a small diversification of conventional portfolios.70 In
other words, the investment management industry responds to rather than shapes
corporate responsibility and sustainability in its allocation and pricing roles.
It may be argued that the European Union’s reform to introduce a taxonomy
of sustainable investments to standardize and improve investment fund labelling

65. See Joseph Cordahi, Woodford saga gives investors a lesson on liquidity risk, FIN. TIMES (June
30, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/d4cc5879-4f13-3ef0-8906-bf126bbde4ee [https://perma.cc/9VKTNJKR] (discussing how Neil Woodford’s Equity Income Fund’s “assets halve[d] in two years”).
66. Beate Sjåfjell, Achieving Corporate Sustainability: What is the Role of the Shareholder?, in
SHAREHOLDERS’ DUTIES ch. 18 (Hanne S Birkmose, ed., 2017).
67. See Katherina Glac, The Influence of Shareholders on Corporate Social Responsibility, 9 ECON.,
MGMT. & FIN. MKTS. 34, 44–55 (2014) (discussing the history and emergence of SRI’s); see generally
Benjamin Richardson, Fossil Fuels Divestment: A Strategy for Sustainability? in SUSTAINABLE TRADE,
INVESTMENT AND FINANCE 280 (Clair Gammage & Tonia Novitz eds., 2019) (discussing the emergence
of SRI’s and divestment from fossil fuels).
68. See Xing Chen & Bert Scholtens, The Urge to Act: A Comparison of Active and Passive Socially
Responsible Investment Funds in the United States, 25 CORP. SOC. RESP. & ENV’T. MGMT. 1, 8–10 (2018)
(comparing levels of active management between actively managed SRI’s and index funds).
69. Erwin Eding & Bert Scholtens, Corporate Social Responsibility and Shareholder Proposals, 24
CORP. SOC. RESP. & ENV’T MGMT. 648, 648 (2017) (finding that shareholders file responsible proposals
in companies already doing good, not to change ill-performing ones). Further, many proposals are
withdrawn and result in incremental corporate change only. See generally Jody Grewal, George Serafeim,
& Aaron Yoon, Shareholder Activism on Sustainability Issues, (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 17003, 2016) (analyzing how proposals on material versus immaterial issues are related to firms’ subsequent
environmental or social performance and market valuation); Giovanna Michelon & Michelle Rodrigue,
Demand for CSR: Insights from Shareholder Proposals, 35 SOC. & ENVTL. ACCOUNTABILITY J. 157
(2015) (analyzing a study of CSR proposals from 1996-2009). Shareholder activism is however on the rise.
See Frank AJ Wagemans, CSA (Kris) Van Koppen & Arthur PJ Mol, Engagement on ESG issues by
Dutch Pension Funds: Is It Reaching Its Full Potential? 8 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 301 (2018); see also
Frank Jan de Graaf & Matthew Haigh, Activism in European Pension Funds: Exerting Pressure on
Intermediaries, in FINANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 1, at 119.
70. Emily Chasan, Bonds to Save the Planet, BLOOMBERG (April 23, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2019-04-23/bonds-to-save-the-planet [https://perma.cc/2UNG-RUK2] (“Green bonds
represent just a little more than 1 percent of the $53 trillion global bond market.”).
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would compel fund managers to connect real sustainable outcomes with
investment strategy.71 This Taxonomy Regulation establishes outcome criteria
for evaluating environmentally sustainable investments and classifying them. The
taxonomy established by the new regulation relieves asset owners of the need to
clarify which environmental sustainability objectives to integrate into their
investment management. This reform also provides service providers in the
investment chain with yardsticks for evaluating such sustainability. The
taxonomy has the potential to cut across the investment chain and reconfigure
systems internalities around the prescribed standards. However, the taxonomy
can also be mediated by existing systems internalities to result in only incremental
changes to investment management practice. Because the outcomes criteria only
refer to environmentally sustainable investment labels, fund managers can avoid
labelling their products as such if they are unable to meet the evaluative demands
with certainty. Instead, they can carry on offering existing socially responsible
investment products.72
The Taxonomy Regulation provides environmentally sustainable product
standardization based on scientifically interrogated outcomes and is arguably a
gold standard. It adheres to a market-choice approach rather than a prescriptive
approach to product standardization and compliance.73 Hence fund managers can
continue to maintain a suite of diverse and competitive products for asset owners,
including products that track sustainable performance based on indices or ESG
ratings.74 Perhaps this is the reason why Securities and Exchange Commission
Chairman Jay Clayton cautions reliance on ESG ratings providers,75 and why the
Chairman of the European Securities and Markets Authority opines that ESG
ratings providers should be regulated in the EU.76 The systems internalities of the
investment chain accentuate the challenges for each entity in the chain to
undertake disruptive change, as these have knock-on effects within the chain.
Hence it is likely that the investment chain as a whole would only embrace
incremental change. This tendency is also likely to insulate the investment chain,
71. See generally Council Regulation 2020/852, art. 7, 2020 O.J. (L198) 13 [hereinafter Sustainable
Investment Regualtion] (outlining a classification system of sustainable investment activities).
72. This labelling may be based on negative or positive screening, or best-in-class approaches that
may include screening or otherwise. See INV. ASS’N, THE RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK
(2019), https://www.theia.org/sites/default/files/2019-11/20191118-iaresponsibleinvestmentframework.
pdf [https://perma.cc/D9J4-GY7Q] (accommodating a wide range of approaches). The Sustainable
Investment Regulation seems to envisage this marketing approach.
73. See Sustainable Investment Regulation, supra note 71 (allowing financial products to be labelled
as not taking into account EU criteria for environmentally sustainable economic activities).
74. Robert G. Eccles, Jock Herron & George Serafeim, Reliable Sustainability Ratings, in THE
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, supra note 20, at 620; Robert G. Eccles &
Judith C. Stroehle, Exploring Social Origins in the Construction of ESG Measures (Saïd Bus. Sch., U.
Oxford Job Market Paper, 2019) (accounting for rating provider differences).
75. Chris Flood, SEC Chair warns of risk tied to ESG ratings, FIN. TIMES (May 27, 2020), https://
www.ft.com/content/2c662135-4fd3-4c1b-9597-2c6f8f17faed [https://perma.cc/M5PH-BS97].
76. Steven Maijoor, Chair, Eur. Sec. & Mkts. Auth., Speech at European Financial Forum:
Sustainable Financial Markets: Translating Changing Risks and Investor Preferences into Regulatory
Action (Feb. 12, 2020).
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focused upon its internal bilateral relationships, from the wider socially
embedded objectives that legislation intends to draw attention to.
However, as the Taxonomy Regulation’s strength lies in environmentally
sustainable investment products, this may have a facilitative impact upon the
growing standardization taking place already in green bonds, making them more
appealing to conventional funds. For example, the Green Bonds Principles and
Climate Bonds Standard have achieved a certain level of standardization for
green bonds.77 This could stimulate a larger market in green bonds and encourage
a significant increase in portfolio allocation to them by conventional investment
funds.78 In this manner, green projects such as envisaged under the EU’s Green
Deal,79 relating to constructing renewable energy facilities, renewable energy
transport infrastructure, and retrofitting existing buildings, can be funded.
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen if allocations to green bonds by conventional
funds would rise, as this trend is relatively new80 and it is uncertain if the trend is
merely a fad. Further, the lack of similar stimulus for a social impact bond market
does not appear to be forthcoming any time soon,81 but a manner of
standardization to facilitate such a market can be developed at a later stage.
IV
SYSTEMS INTERNALITIES AND THE REFORM AGENDA FOR INVESTEE
COMPANIES
The current European reform agenda for companies can be traced back to
the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008–09 that shook society-business
relations as well as government-business relations, resulting in regulatory
initiatives for companies in relation to a variety of areas of responsibility, from
anti-corruption to human rights to environmental impact.82 These reforms in the
EU and U.K., however, center on mandatory disclosure. The EU’s 2014 NonFinancial Disclosure Directive introduced the requirement for listed companies
77. See generally ICMA, GREEN BOND PRINCIPLES (2018), https://www.icmagroup.org/
assets/documents/Regulatory/Green-Bonds/Green-Bonds-Principles-June-2018-270520.pdf [https://
perma.cc/WT3J-TWK3]; Certification under the Climate Bonds Standard, CLIMATE BONDS INITIATIVE,
https://www.climatebonds.net/certification [https://perma.cc/NW4P-HFKC].
78. See generally Cristina M. Banahan, The Bond Villains of Green Investment: Why an Unregulated
Securities Market Needs Government to Lay Down the Law, 43 VT. L. REV. 841 (2019) (arguing for the
creation of U.S. Green Standards Committee that would help increase the market for green bonds).
79. A European Green Deal, EUROPEAN COMM’N (2019), https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/
priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en [https://perma.cc/T4MU-C4DD].
80. Although in light of policy drivers, fund flows into ‘green’ labels have increased significantly
from early 2020. Owen Walker, Low Carbon Fund is Best-Seller in January, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/9dcdfecb-0446-4c06-8021-b80bfd7ffb6d [https://perma.cc/57T7-B95R].
81. Such stimulus could include social impacts such as social cohesion, social integration and labor
relations, or an investment in human capital or economically or socially disadvantaged communities, but
these are neither fully defined in relation to outcomes, unlike the EU Council Regulation 2020/852, nor
exhaustive. The definition however provides a ‘floor’ that any sustainably labelled product must do no
significant harm to enumerated environmental and social objectives above.
82. See generally Iris H-Y Chiu, An Institutional Theory of Corporate Regulation, 71 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBS. 279 (2018) (outlining changes in corporate behavior after the 2007–08 financial crisis).
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to report on their policies and performance with regard to environmental, human
rights, employee, and anti-corruption aspects, highlighting the need for
companies to adopt and disclose due diligence policies and non-financial key
performance indicators.83 This was followed by a slew of other social
responsibility-based non-financial disclosure requirements such as EU importers’
obligations to disclose and audit due diligence policies in sourcing for tin,
tungsten, tantalum and gold from conflict regions,84 the U.K.’s imposition of
supply chain due diligence disclosure on certain private and public organizations
under the Modern Slavery Act,85 disclosure of directors’ strategic consideration
of stakeholder relations,86 disclosure of large private companies’ corporate
governance,87 pay ratio reporting,88 gender pay gap reporting89 and more recently,
climate transition risks for listed companies.90
Commentators are of the view that mandatory disclosure introduces
regulatory conditioning of companies’ socially-facing behavior and leads to
change from within.91 But mandatory disclosure, even outside of the realm of
securities regulation, such as under the Modern Slavery or Conflict Minerals
legislations, operates within the systems internalities of the shareholder-investee
company relationship.92 Shareholders can bring a blend of social and market
pressures upon their investee companies,93 contributing to the remaking of a
83. See Iris H-Y Chiu, Disclosure Regulation in Sustainability: Legalisation and Governance
Implications, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 23, at 523–24 (outlining the 2014 Non-Financial Disclosure Directive).
84. See generally Council Regulation (EU) 2017/821, 2017 O.J. (L130) 1.
85. 2015, c. 30, §54 (Eng.).
86. UK Companies Act 2006, c. 4, §414 (Eng.).
87. Id. at sched. 7.
88. Id. at sched. 8.
89. The Equality Act 2010 (Gender Pay Gap Information) Regulations 2017, SI 2017/172 (UK).
90. The UK Financial Conduct Authority intends to require premium-listed companies to report
climate transition risks according to the Task Force on Climate Disclosure’s template. TASK FORCE ON
CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATERELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES (June 2017), https://assets.bbhub.io/company/sites/60/2020/
10/FINAL-2017-TCFD-Report-11052018.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MVW-JFVS].
91. See generally Federica Murmura, Laura Bravi & Federica Palazzi, Evaluating Companies’
Commitment to Corporate Social Responsibility: Perceptions of the SA 8000 Standard, 164 J. CLEANER
PROD. 1406, (2017) (explaining how regulations can create changes from within organizations); Ioannis
Ioannou & George Serafeim, The Consequences of Mandatory Corporate Sustainability Reporting (Harv.
Bus. Sch., Working Paper 11-100, Aug. 20, 2014) (outlining how sustainability reporting influences
organizations’ behavior).
92. See generally Genevieve LeBaron & Andreas Rühmkorf, Steering CSR Through Home State
Regulation: A Comparison of the Impact of the UK Bribery Act and Modern Slavery Act on Global Supply
Chain Governance, 8 GLOB. POL’Y 15 (2017) (discussing the impacts of mandatory reporting on
corporate behavior).
93. Many institutions’ beneficiaries are socially interested, if not pro-social. See generally George
Apostolakis et al., Predicting Pension Beneficiaries’ Behaviour When Offered a Socially Responsible and
Impact Investment Portfolio, 8 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 213 (2018); Lei Delsen & Alex Lehr, Value
Matters or Values Matter? An Analysis of Heterogeneity in Preferences for Sustainable Investments, 9 J.
SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 240 (2019). Investors evaluate the sustainable risks and profiles of companies
and price stocks accordingly. Pricing pressures, which affect a company’s stock price, access to capital,
the CEO’s remuneration etc., would incentivize changes to corporate behavior. Michael Schröder,
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sustainable business model. Indeed, empirical research finds corporate behavior
change driven by compliance with regulatory obligations.94 This may allow us to
consider that regulatory obligations such as mandatory disclosure can affect the
systems internalities of the shareholder-investee company relationship, framed
in an agency-based paradigm, in order to change corporate behavior to an
extent.95
European policymakers see shareholders’ roles as potentially constructive
due to their being socially embedded in a landscape of decentered regulation. But
some commentators are of the view that the dominant tenet of shareholder
primacy in many jurisdictions’ corporate law is a primary handicap to companies’
social citizenship and to their sustainability goals and the SDGs.96 Shareholders
are ultimately concerned with financial performance and their incentives are
insufficient for galvanizing companies to become sustainable enterprises,97 not to
mention that their incentives can be misleading or even perverse.98
Commentators call for reform to the effect that company directors should have
direct duties of sustainability,99 or enforceable duties owed to stakeholders and
supply chains,100 or that companies should serve corporate purposes that serve

Financial Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility: A Literature Review 4 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV.
337, 339-340 (2018); but see Marien de Haan, Lammertjan Dam & Bert Scholtens, The Drivers of the
Relationship Between Corporate Environmental Performance and Stock Market Returns, 2 J.
SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 338 (2012) (finding pricing effects are negligible).
94. Rosa Maria Dangelico & Devashish Pujari, Mainstreaming Green Product Innovation:
Why and How Companies Integrate Environmental Sustainability, 95 J. BUS. ETHICS 471, 474 (2010).
95. Suggested in. David Wood, Ben Thornley & Katie Grace, ‘Institutional Impact Investing:
Practice and Policy’ (2013) 3 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 75, 82.
96. For case studies on corporate law, corporate governance and sustainability, see THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY,
supra note 17, at 129–518. See also Griffiths, supra note 2.
97. Rajna Gibson Brandon & Philipp Krüger, The Sustainability Footprint of Institutional Investors,
(ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 571/2018, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2918926 [https://
perma.cc/7AG6-6AVV]; see Heather Hachigian & Sarah M. McGill, Reframing the Governance
Challenge for Sustainable Investment, (2012) 2 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 166, 169 (explaining that
traditional incentives are “no longer adequate to engage with sustainability problems.”).
98. See generally Reint Gropp & Matthias Köhler, Bank Owners or Bank Managers: Who is Keen
on Risk? Evidence from the Financial Crisis, (Eur. Bus. Sch., Research Paper No. 10-02, 2010), http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1555663 [https://perma.cc/36CY-HFXY] (suggesting shareholders pressure banks into
excessive risk-taking before the global financial crisis).
99. Andrew Johnston & Beate Sjåfjell, The EU’s Approach to Environmentally Sustainable
Business: Can Disclosure Overcome the Failings of Shareholder Primacy?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
EU ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 405 (Marjan Peeters & Mariolina Eliantonio eds., 2020); see generally
Thomas Clarke, The Search for Sustainability in Financial Markets: Carbon Bubbles, Shifting Tectonic
Paradigms, and Natural Capital Coalitions, 10 L. & FIN. MKT. REV. 139 (2016) (discussing the duties of
directors in light of threats from climate change). But see Florian Moslein & Karsten Engsig Sorensen,
Nudging for Corporate Long-Termism and Sustainability: Regulatory Instruments from a Comparative
and Functional Perspective, 24 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 391 (2018) (describing a more cautious approach to
encouraging sustainable practices through regulation).
100. See generally Jingchen Zhao, Extraterritorial Attempts at Addressing Challenges to Corporate
Sustainability, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AND SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 17, at 29–42; Sybren C. de Hoo & Mieke Olaerts, Sustainable
Development and the Need for Sustainable Oriented Corporate Law and Regulation, (Univ. of Oslo,
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multiple stakeholders or are oriented towards global sustainability.101 These
would entail a public interest conception of the company wherein all privately
innovated economic activity should be nested within the social fabric or be
dominantly shaped by it.
Such reforms purport to radically change the systems internalities revolving
around the corporation. However, these are empirically observed to be more
complex than being labelled as shareholder-focused or stakeholder-focused.
Corporations are at the same time more internally as well as externally shaped in
relation to their strategies and behavior than envisaged by those subscribing to
shareholder primacy or stakeholder-based theories of the corporation. First,
corporations are themselves an internal system of organizational power and
knowledge implementation and are not necessarily ‘remade’ by shareholders or
stakeholders. Corporations can be affected by their resource constraints and
managerial or structural insularity in taking incremental or even cosmetic
responses to sustainability challenges.102 However, corporations may choose to
be strategically innovative and hence have a culture that may internalize new
sustainability challenges more positively and effectively.103 Leadership and key
employees matter in the value framing of sustainability,104 as well as in the
structural agility of companies.105 Further, corporations may be externally
influenced by collective stakeholder perceptions,106 and not just by pressure
Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2011-29, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1926065
[https://perma.cc/2MB4-KNWR].
101. See generally RICHARDSON & SJÅFJELL, supra note 17.
102. See generally Wojciech Przychodzen & Justyna Przychodzen, Sustainable Innovations in the
Corporate Sector: The Empirical Evidence from IBEX 35 Firms, 172 J. CLEANER PROD. 3557 (2018)
(discussing the factors that influence firms’ levels of sustainable innovation); see also Stefan Schaltegger
et al., Involving Corporate Functions: Who Contributes to Sustainable Development?, 6 SUSTAINABILITY
3064 (2014) (discussing involvement of different functional groups within corporations and their impacts
on sustainable developments).
103. See generally Katharina Fellnhofer, Drivers of Innovation Success in Sustainable Businesses, 167
J. CLEANER PROD. 1534 (2017) (discussing the impact of entrepreneurial business culture and innovation
in sustainable practices); Esben Rahbek et al., Exploring the Relationship Between Business Model
Innovation, Corporate Sustainability, and Organisational Values within the Fashion Industry, 149 J. BUS.
ETHICS 267 (2018) (discussing the impact of organizational values on the development of innovative
sustainable practices in the fashion industry).
104. Romana Rauter et al., Going One’s Own Way: Drivers in Developing Business Models for
Sustainability, 140 J. CLEANER PROD. 144, 151 (2017); see generally Sandra Naomi Morioka et al.,
Transforming Sustainability Challenges into Competitive Advantage: Multiple Case Studies Kaleidoscope
Converging into Sustainable Business Models, 167 J. CLEANER PROD. 723 (2017) (discussing how
business purpose and employees’ values on sustainability interact); M. Yang et al., Value Uncaptured
Perspective for Sustainable Business Model Innovation, 140 J. CLEANER PROD. 1794 (2017) (discussing
how to incorporate sustainability into value propositions); for the effect of corporate governance, see also
Paul Shrivastava & Amr Addas, The Impact of Corporate Governance on Sustainability Performance, 4
J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 21 (2014).
105. Romain Allais, Lionel Roucoules & Tatiana Reyes, Governance Maturity Grid: A Transition
Method for Integrating Sustainability into Companies?, 140 J. CLEANER PROD. 213 (2017) (discussing
how to use maturity grids to help companies transition efficiently to sustainable business models).
106. See generally Esben Rahbek et al., From Resistance to Opportunity-Seeking: Strategic Responses
to Institutional Pressures for Corporate Social Responsibility in the Nordic Fashion Industry, 119 J. BUS.
ETHICS 245 (2014) (discussing institutional pressures and their influence on corporate behavior).
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applied by particular interest groups, industry trends, and network
collaborations, in determining strategic and operational reform to meet
sustainability challenges.107 In other words, those relying on shareholder- or
stakeholder-based legal reforms to change corporate behavior see only the
agency-based systems internalities that affect corporations, and fail to take into
account resource-based and isomorphic views of the systems internalities
revolving around them.108
It is arguable that legal requirements too heavily presume that law, mobilizing
external forces—whether shareholders or stakeholders—would entail causative
changes to corporate behavior. This may be the case regardless of whether we
are relying on the shareholder-focused mandatory disclosure rules that we hope
would change corporate behavior, or the more radical reforms proposed by
commentators to expand directors’ duties and accountability or stakeholders’
roles in corporate governance. Accountability to stakeholders does not mean that
companies would adjust their share of carbon emissions or planetary boundary
preservation. A complex set of stakeholders could also influence companies to
focus on their insular and bilateral demands upon the company, such as in the codetermination context observed by Klaus Hopt.109 It is a much more complex
challenge to connect the systems internalities of corporate structures and culture
with public-interest objectives. At the same time, corporate contributions toward
or support of public interest goals does not mean the vision or preferences of
particular entrepreneurs and the freedom of private enterprise and wealth
creation are swallowed up. The EU’s mainstreaming agenda in sustainable
finance intends to have a massive impact, resulting from the simultaneous
reorientation of investors’ and their investee companies’ prioritization of
sustainability objectives. However, due to the interrogation of these reforms
within the systems internalities of the institutional investment industry and the
corporate sector, these effects are likely to be patchier than envisaged.110
107. See generally Johan Frishammar & Vinit Parida, Circular Business Model Transformation: A
Roadmap for Incumbent Firms, 61 CAL. MGMT. REV. 5 (2019) (discussing network collaboration by firms
in the context of transitions to circular business models); Eva Niesten et al., Sustainable Collaboration:
The Impact of Governance and Institutions on Sustainable Performance, 155 J. CLEANER PROD. 1 (2017)
(explaining how collaboration-based governance strategies can lead to sustainable outcomes); Ronan
Bolton & Matthew Hannon, Governing Sustainability Transitions Through Business Model Innovation:
Towards a Systems Understanding, 45 RES. POL’Y 1742 (2016) (discussing how a systems-based approach
to analyzing business models can reveal new insights into improving sustainability).
108. See Bryan W. Husted & José Milton de Sousa-Filho, The Impact of Sustainability Governance,
Country Stakeholder Orientation, and Country Risk on Environmental, Social, and Governance
Performance, 155 J. CLEANER PROD. 93, 100 (2017) (finding that collaborative sustainability governance
has the greatest impact on ESG performance); see generally Robert Sroufe, Integration and
Organizational Change Towards Sustainability, 162 J. CLEANER PROD. 315 (2017) (arguing for
integration and factoring in sustainability metrics as performance metrics).
109. See Klaus Hopt, Labor Representation on Corporate Boards: Impacts and Problems for
Corporate Governance and Economic Integration in Europe, 14 INT’L REV. L. ECON. 203 (1994)
(discussing relationship between labor co-determination and corporate governance).
110. See generally Karen Delchet-Cochet & Linh Chi Vo, CSR Implementation in French SMEs: An
Adapted Framework, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF INVESTING IN THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE, supra
note 62, at 373 (discussing the implementation of CSR in small and medium-sized enterprises).
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V
CONCLUSION
Mobilizing capital markets for sustainable finance products still needs to be
connected with achieving overall sustainable goals.111 This is because sustainable
finance does not necessarily remake private economic behavior. Policymakers
may need to be more proactive in steering conventional economic behavior as
well as promoting alternative forms of economic behavior that are socially
oriented. The decentered regulatory space perhaps needs to be re-centered upon
regulators and policymakers who can supply steering.112 For example, should
regulators provide more definitive guidance as to the share of burdens or
responsibility on private sector entities’ part, in relation to hard targets such as
the SDGs or planetary boundaries?113
One wonders if regulating sustainable finance needs to be more radical, like
the remaking of bank regulation after the global financial crisis. Post-crisis
reforms included regulatory interventions into bank risk management, corporate
governance,114 individual management responsibility,115 and financial institution
transparency,116 culminating in new relational paradigms between regulated
subjects and their more vigilant regulators.117 The rebuilding of regulatory
systems for finance gave rise to new systems internalities where regulatory
supervision and regulatory accountability became focal while interacting with the
111. See Jay Cullen, After ‘HLEG’: EU Banks, Climate Change Abatement and the Precautionary
Principle, 20 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 61 (2018) (arguing for further intervention in
financial markets to mitigate the uncertain risks of climate change).
112. See generally Joern Fischer et al., Human Behavior and Sustainability, 10 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY
& ENV’T 153 (2012) (arguing for the need for global stewardship for sustainability); ANTONI
ESTEVADEORDAL & LOUIS W. GOODMAN, 21ST CENTURY COOPERATION: REGIONAL PUBLIC
GOODS, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2017) (explaining the
importance of regional public goods for sustainable development).
113. See, e.g., Alma Pekmezovic, Re-Orienting the Global Finanacial System Towards Sustainability,
in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS, supra note 2, at 121, 121–42 (discussing reforms that would
steer the financial system toward sustainability goals); Geoff Kendall & Martin Rich, The Future-Fit
Business Benchmark: Flourishing Business in a Truly Sustainable Future, in SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT GOALS, supra note 2, at 235, 235–51 (same); see generally Christoph Butz et al., Towards
Defining an Environmental Investment Universe Within Planetary Boundaries, 13 SUSTAINABILITY SCI.
1031 (2018) (discussing a planetary boundaries framework for setting sustainability targets).
114. Council Directive 2013/36, art. 86–90 2013 O.J. (L176) 338, 382–385; see generally IRIS H-Y
CHIU, REGULATING (FROM) THE INSIDE: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNAL CONTROL IN
BANKS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 256–59 (2015) (discussing corporate governance of financial
institutions).
115. See IRIS H-Y CHIU & JOANNA WILSON, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 295 (2019)
(discussing the senior managers and certified persons regime under the UK Prudential Regulation
Authority Rulebook and Financial Conduct Authority Handbook).
116. See generally Iris H-Y Chiu, Transparency Regulation in Financial Markets- Moving into the
Surveillance Age? 3 EUR. J. RISK & REG. 303 (2011) (discussing transparency regulations that were
imposed after the financial crisis).
117. Financial regulators employ more judgment-based regulation, i.e. forward-looking addressing
of potential problems, see FCA, JOURNEY TO THE FCA (2012), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/
pubs/other/journey-to-the-fca-standard.pdf [https://perma.cc/T98C-G85D] (explaining the creation and
purpose of the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority).
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systems internalities of finance as private enterprises.118 Corporations should
concurrently be: the private enterprises that create wealth for their circles of
stakeholders; the social citizens that contribute to mitigation and abatement of
environmental and social harms; and contributors to positive fulfilment of the
SDGs. Further, policymakers and regulators should enable and facilitate
alternative business forms and fundraising, such as by social enterprises.119 It is
likely that economic contribution to sustainability objectives can be more
effectively achieved by a combination of diverse approaches with more deliberate
policy leadership.120

118. See generally MADS ANDENAS & IRIS H-Y CHIU, THE FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE OF
FINANCIAL REGULATION (2014).
119. See generally Nicholas E. Florek, Enabling Social Enterprise Through Regulatory Innovation: A
Case Study from the United Kingdom, 3 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 155 (2013) (discussing how social
enterprises obtain their resources); Carol Liao, Limits to Corporate Reform and Alternative Legal
Structures, in COMPANY LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY supra note 17, at 274 (discussing the importance of
the emerging social enterprise model in sustainability outcomes).
120. See generally Halina Ward, The ISO 26000 International Guidance Standard on Social
Responsibility: Implications for Public Policy and Transnational Democracy, 12 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 665 (2011).

